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This paper provides insight into the use of data tools in the
American labor movement by analyzing the practices of staff
employed by unions to organize alongside union members.
We interviewed 23 field-level staff organizers about how they
use data tools to evaluate membership. We find that organizers
work around and outside of these tools to develop necessary
data access for union members and calibrate data representa-
tions to meet local needs. Organizers mediate between local
and central versions of the data, and draw on their contextual
knowledge to challenge campaign strategy. We show how
networked data tools can limit field organizers’ discretion,
making it more difficult for unions to assess and act on the will
of union membership. We argue that the use of networked data
tools can contribute to data degradation under top-down orga-
nizational structures, and discuss how bottom-up approaches
to data gathering can lead to more accurate assessments in
organizing contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
As it becomes feasible to render more aspects of life into data,
collective organizations find themselves looking toward new
data practices to better understand and respond to their mem-
bers. Proponents of “data-driven” organizational strategies
claim data collection and analysis will create actionable in-
sights that will make organizations more effective, efficient,
and resilient [53]. Yet this abstract vision of data obscures the
necessary role of the “human[s] in the loop” [6]. Research in
HCI and CSCW has counteracted this narrative by centering
the human experience of making the data work [32, 49, 50]
and critically engaging with the implications of data-driven
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decision-making in light of the inherent decontextualization
that comes with large datasets [17, 11, 60].
In this research, we examine data practices and data-driven
decision-making within labor unions in the United States.
Unions are a useful case study for exploring challenges in
data-driven organizations because they have a long-standing
commitment to understanding and responding to their mem-
bership. They have always been “data driven,” in that a core
component of the labor movement’s organizing model is to
identify, map, and systematically evaluate every worker in
the workplace in terms of their support for and propensity to
become active in the union [35].
When the labor movement first entered cyberspace at the turn
of the 21st century, unionists pondered the degree to which net-
worked computing technologies could support more meaning-
ful communication between union leaders and the will of rank-
and-file union members [21]. In support of the “CyberUnion,”
labor scholar Arthur Shostak argued that networked tools
would “empower the rank-and-file as never before” by con-
necting union members through shared issues, helping them
come together to push back against undemocratic practices,
both in the workplace and in the union [57]. Gary Chaison
countered this enthusiastic support with his concern that such
technologies would instead function as an impersonal com-
munication tool for union leadership [22]. He also predicted
that the labor movement’s technology use would be effective
for mobilizing only “supportive participation” (“relatively pas-
sive activities that require little time and effort, for example
reading the union’s web page and discussing union issues with
co-workers”) among members instead of the more effortful
bottom-up leadership envisioned by Shostak [22].
As unions embrace networked computing tools for outreach
and membership assessment, it is clear there are still serious
communication barriers in the labor movement. These bar-
riers are well illustrated by a recent attempt by the United
Auto Workers (UAW) to unionize a Volkswagen plant in Chat-
tanooga, Tennessee. In the US, elections to certify a union are
decided by a majority of votes cast by eligible workers [13].
Prior to the vote, the UAW’s data showed a clear majority of
workers supporting unionization. However, those assessments
did not translate into majority “yes” votes on the ballot. Post-
campaign analysis [19] attributed the loss to several factors,
including an effective anti-union campaign by the employer.
However, the mistaken assessment of member support was
specifically attributed to “shallow organizing” or a failure by
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UAW to build a strong organization through member participa-
tion [19]. Basing most of their assessments on conversations
with workers conducted by union staff, instead of on workers’
participation in organized collective action leading up to the
election, may have led UAW to calculate their levels of support
on inaccurate or misleading data [20].
This critique of UAW’s strategy resonates with Chaison’s con-
cerns about “supportive participation” in that both underscore
a concern for the lack of bottom-up, member-led participation
in union action. But the role for networked data technology in
fostering member-led participation, and what it has the poten-
tial to enable, is less straightforward. In the forecasts of the
Cyberunion, enthusiastic and anxious alike, it was envisioned
that membership would be able to directly communicate with
the union in cyberspace (e.g. through websites, chatrooms, and
email listservs)[56]. In Chattanooga, the “cyberunion” had a
different structure: while information about members almost
certainly went into cyberspace via networked data tools, the
interactions that data represented occurred in real life, in the
Volkswagen plant and its surrounding parking-lots, and in the
houses and front doorsteps of the people who worked there;
they were conducted and rendered into data by activists and
union staff organizers (i.e. ‘humans in the loop’).
Our research responds to older debates on the role of net-
worked computing technology in the labor movement by ex-
amining how data tools are currently being used by unions to
understand their membership. In order to understand how data
collection is being conducted and how data practices could
support effective organizing, we look at the data practices of
field-level staff organizers. These organizers work alongside
workplace member activists and report to union leadership,
functioning as necessary intermediaries between union strat-
egy and resources and the will of the rank-and-file. We focus
specifically on their use of technology to track membership
and membership support as a mechanism for communicating
what’s happening on the ground.
Our results unpack the relationship between data tools and
organizing strategy to show how networked data management
systems impact the on-the-ground experiences of staff organiz-
ers, and what work they must do to make the data useful for
the union and for themselves. We argue that data degradation–
a decreased accuracy of the unions’ assessments of member
support–arises from a combination of the properties of net-
worked data tools with the precarious position of field organiz-
ers in top-down organizing campaigns. We propose alternative
approaches to tool use that may better coordinate members’
needs with union strategy by assessing different aspects of
member participation on the ground.
RELATED WORK
Workers, Data, and Organizations
Our work is informed by research into the impacts of informa-
tion technology in organizations [47, 48, 46]. Prior work has
shown how “informating [66] systems” (tools that transform
descriptions of activities into information) reconfigure power
relations at different levels of an organization. This continues
to be a topic of interest for CSCW because the impacts of mak-
ing information visible in complex organizational contexts are
not always straightforward.
Making work visible both reveals and impacts power relations
in the workplace [59, 25]. For example, including nursing
work as part of permanent medical records can have the effect
of legitimating the work of nurses which has previously been
rendered functionally invisible [16]. On the other hand, the
same visibility can confer greater administrative burden [63]
and diminish nurses’ ability to exercise discretion [58]. The
impact of digital data management tools has been studied in
healthcare systems, where the digitization of medical records
impacts the discretion and accountability of medical and data
workers [15, 52]. But, at the same time, design choices which
lower the discretion of the medical professionals can draw
attention to and legitimate the work of medical administra-
tive staff [55]. Our research speaks to this discussion as an
empirical moment to see how informating systems shape the
experience of work for entry-level professional workers in the
labor movement, as the systems serve to make field organizers’
work immediately visible to different levels of the organiza-
tion, while at the same time, fail to capture the organizers’
contextual knowledge.
Data-driven Activism
Prior research in HCI has identified how activists collect and
analyze data to produce “actionable” outcomes (informing
and persuading stakeholders, securing project resources) in
resource-constrained contexts with limited access to data and
technical expertise [5], and while upholding commitments to
democratic and participatory data processes [39]. Beyond the
creation of data, activist-driven data practices support civic en-
gagement by bringing members of the community into spaces
of collective negotiation and planning [40]. They also have
the potential to reveal competing needs and commitments of
different stakeholders [8]. The study of data practices in the
labor movement speak to this work because unions consist of
mutually accountable stakeholders (described below) working
toward shared goals with different accountabilities.
Research in CHI and CSCW has also looked into how civic
and community activist groups use data technologies [28, 30,
29, 34]. Research into how activist groups use “illegitimate”
[9] technology to mobilize, particularly during times of cri-
sis, reveals that most activists groups organize and maintain
their organizations using free tools offered by companies like
Google and Facebook, while a technically savvy minority de-
sign and actively use alternative technologies (e.g. ones that
prioritize security)[7]. The data practices of labor unions ex-
plores how the use of off-the-shelf data tools complements the
use of bespoke systems to mobilize participation, in-person
and in the data work, in the context of long-term organizing
projects.
Our study of the data practices in labor unions is also informed
by prior work studying the role of data tools, and the impera-
tive to become “data-driven,” in electoral and non-profit work
contexts. The uneasy discrepancy between the promises of
becoming data-driven and the practical reality of what hap-
pens on the ground has been illustrated in electoral work [43,
10], where researchers have explored the extent to which data
practices actually support effective strategy in political cam-
paigns. Prior work studying the data practices in non-profit
organizations has identified the benefits and challenges to ap-
plying business-driven analytic data systems in mission-driven
contexts [61, 62], arguing that data-driven evaluation [12] and
monitoring practices can disempower nonprofit organizations
[14]. Like political campaigns and other nonprofit organi-
zations, unions look to data to inform their use of material
resources and rely on a combination of paid and volunteer
labor. Union data practices shed light on what happens when
the data needs to be accountable not only to leadership and
external funding bodies, but also, potentially, to the people it
describes.
BACKGROUND: UNION ORGANIZING
There are several approaches to union organizing that have
been put into practice throughout the history of the labor move-
ment. Our case study explores how labor unions gather data
about their membership. This section describes practices that
are generally consistent across our interviews, addressing the
thinking behind data practices leading up to, and after, a union-
ization campaign. We describe the role of a staff organizer in a
union campaign, both in relationship to member activists, and
within the context of a union at the state and national levels.
Finally, we situate the use of contemporary data tools against
older practices to give the context of their use in modern cam-
paigns.
Member Assessment
A key data practice for labor unions is member assessment,
i.e. collecting up-to-date data about the degree to which in-
dividual workers support the union. Labor unions typically
assess support for unionization among prospective members
to guide strategy during organizing campaigns. Before a union
is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for employees
in a unit, membership is assessed to gauge whether the union
has enough support to guarantee recognition by a majority of
votes cast for the union in a recognition election (or through
majority support by authorization cards in the case of a vol-
untary recognition [13]). After recognition, unions continue
to assess member support, especially leading up to contract
negotiations, to calculate whether it is realistic for the union to
call a strike (the decision to strike is also decided by majority
vote). Worker support for the union is measured using a series
of “tests” (sometimes called “asks”) such as signing a public
petition in support of the union, wearing a union sticker or
shirt to work, or posing for individual or group photos for a
public poster. These tests are planned by union staff and mem-
ber activists on the organizing committee, and then distributed
to the membership through a system of staff organizers and
member activists. The structured conversations with workers
leading up to the test form the basis for the assessment along
with the outcome of the test (e.g. ‘did they sign the petition?’).
The mechanics of assessing union support vary across union
campaigns. For example, in the The American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees Organizer (AF-
SCME) Organizer handbook, the assessment system uses a
system where “1” corresponds to active support and leader-
ship, “2” is a “solid union supporter” (“passed every test... If
the election were today 2s would vote yes”), “3” is “undecided
or moveable” and “4” is not supportive of the union, with
“no clear path to move them to support” [1]. Other numerical
schemes are also used, for example Rogers et al. describe
assessment categories used in the 2010 representation election
at Delta Air Lines, where Association of Flight Attendants-
Communication Workers of America (AFA-CWA) flight at-
tendants were rated a “1” if they would vote “yes” for the
AFA-CWA , “2” if “undecided”, “3” if “no”, and “4” if they
were a “strong no” and “expected to work against unionization”
[54].
The data collected through assessments guides union strategy
in several ways. Most immediately, assessments help orga-
nizers track changes in support for the union (“movement”).
Assessments are used to allocate campaign resources [44] and
gauge whether the union is ready to go to a recognition vote
or strike, which is why it is important for the assessment to
accurately reflect workers’ stances. Organizers and activists
are trained on how to assess workers, and–ideally–discuss
assessments in debriefs with central union staff (one on one
or in groups) to review and calibrate assessments. Typically,
the organizing committee and union staff will work together
to establish benchmarks for assessments to track the level of
support and set thresholds for moving forward with stages of
the campaign (e.g. when to make contact, when to go public,
when to file a petition for a union election). For example, a
union could wait to file a petition for a recognition election
until at least 60 percent of the unit signed authorization cards
[18].
The Professional Organizer
Professional field organizers employed by the union are an
important intermediary in union data collection. Prior work
traces the development of professional union workers [23,
23, 24, 37, 65] and specifically field-level staff [38]. The
results of a recent longitudinal study [64] on labor unions’
hiring practices indicate that unions increasingly hire staff
with higher levels of education levels and experience working
for other unions and progressive organizations outside the
labor movement. Drawing on prior work, our interviews, and
online union job postings [3], we categorize field organizers
(sometimes “staff organizers”) as union staff who work directly
with membership to identify attitudes of individual workers
and recruit member activists. Activists are workers with a
demonstrated commitment to the union (union supporters who
attend meetings or complete assigned tasks).
Field organizers travel to job sites, conduct house visits to
communicate with workers, and maintain lists of employee
information. Field organizers report to lead organizers, who,
in addition to being responsible for leading field organizers
and activist leaders, may also conduct house and worksite
visits. The next level of union staffers includes campaign
directors, national representatives, and regional and area di-
rectors. Unions also employ professionals at the state and
national levels. While different organizing models outline dif-
ferent roles for union staff in union campaign decision-making
[42], prior research exploring the role of union staff suggests
that they are a consistent variable in union organizing success
[36].
Data Collection
American labor unions have relied on analog information tools
such as member lists and "chains" (a networked systems of
leads and their followers) for building networks of union sup-
porters since at least the 1930s [31, 42, 51], long before the
use of digital tools. Before the introduction of databases, mem-
bership data was organized into binders containing individual
worker files and charts for groups of workers organized by
building, shift, or unit. While union records are now stored
digitally, contemporary data practices may still involve paper
for membership cards, recording notes about conversations,
and circulating lists for organizers and activists to use in the
field. Domain specific (and general) data tools discussed in
our interviews are described in our results, but unions also
collect data from third parties, employers, public records, and
political organizations, notably NGP VAN (formerly “Voter
Activation Network,”) a voter database and associated mobile
canvassing app–miniVAN–used by the American Democratic
Party and other non-profit organizations authorized by the
Democratic Party [33, 27].
APPROACH
The key question we ask in this study is how data collection
tools and the work practices surrounding them are shaping,
and could shape, communication between rank-and-file mem-
bers and union decision-making. We investigate this question
by examining the data practices of field organizers, important
intermediaries in collecting data about members and commu-
nicating this data to higher-level union staff. We look at how
networked data management systems impact field workers’ ex-
periences, and what work they must do to make this data useful
for the union and for their own everyday work as organizers.
Our investigation is rooted in an interview study focused on
people who had, at some point, been paid by a labor union to
organize workers. We found participants via snowball sam-
pling from personal contacts and through a local workers’
center. We conducted a qualitative, semi-structured interview
study using a protocol exploring the following areas of inter-
est:
• The organizing background of the interviewee, what kinds
of campaigns they had worked on, and whether they had
organizing experience in other contexts (e.g. community,
non-profit, political/electoral)
• The day-to-day context of their organizing work (either on
a specific campaign, or across different projects) and who
they interacted with (e.g. regular members or committed
activists)
• Documentation practices, including how they recorded con-
versations they had or debriefed about with an activist, and
how assessments were conducted
• The role of digital and analog tools in their work, including
the degree of access different people had to the tool, and
who made decisions regarding the use of digital tools
• How their work was evaluated, and the role of data work in
organizer evaluation.
Because some of the questions we asked had the potential to
encourage negative assessments by the interviewees of past,
present, and future employers, we report on our results in
ways that protect the identities of our interviewees through
pseudonymous descriptions of their work context. Organizers
were informed before the interview about the goals of the
research, i.e. to expose technical research audiences to the
opportunities and constraints of using organizing tools in union
settings, in order to improve the design of future tools and
data strategy in the labor movement. Organizers were not
compensated for participating in the interview. Our study was
vetted and approved by our institution’s IRB.
We interviewed 23 people, conducting 24 interviews that lasted
about an hour (63 minutes on average). Everyone we inter-
viewed had, at some point, been employed by a labor union
to work with membership data. All but two of the people
we interviewed had worked as field-level organizers (one had
been hired starting as a lead organizer, and one had no formal
union organizing experience). All but three of the people we
interviewed were still working in the labor movement at the
time of the interview. For the people who gave a starting year,
the average date that people began working for a union was
2013.
The interviewees had experience organizing in the following
sectors: higher education (graduate, faculty, adjunct, admin-
istrative) (17), teachers (k-12, charter, paraprofessional) (5),
health care (nurses, lab technicians) (6), home health care
workers (2), hotel (2), public employees (accountants, actu-
aries, analysts, elevator technicians) (2), retail workers (1),
custodial workers (1), and airport workers (1). Our results
could potentially be shaped by the lack of building trades
union staffers in our interview pool; these unions hire from
within their own membership at a higher rate than profes-
sional and service unions [64] and thus were less reachable
through snowball sampling from other sectors. It is possible
that building trade unions may have different organizational
relationships because the staffers are hired from within the
unions’ membership.
Interviews addressed tools that organizers were using to track
and store membership data: union-specific software (e.g.
Broadstripes[2] and Unionware[4]); Customer Relationship
Management (CRM) tools (e.g. Everyaction); cloud-based
database tools (Airtable, KNACK); desktop database tools
(Microsoft access); Excel and Google Sheets; and other tools.
The research team met to discuss initial trends arising from the
interviews as a preparation for analysis. The primary author
then conducted an inductive analysis of our interview data,
including notes and transcripts, using standard processes of
iterative coding, memoing, and refinement of categories [26].
Initial codes included data anxieties, data aspirations, forms of
work required to make the systems “work”, and organizational
pressures and constraints of data work. Subsequent analysis
grouped related pressures and constraints, categorized forms
of work, refined the sources of pressures and constraints, and
identified the role of technical expertise and worker discretion
in making and implementing decisions about how data tools
were used.
RESULTS
In our study, we found field organizers were continually nav-
igating two aspects of membership data in their use of net-
worked data tools: 1) how to negotiate varying levels of access
to member data and 2) how to calibrate the structure of data
to usefully represent locally relevant aspects while still cre-
ating reusable and interoperable data. Union organizers did
face other recurring challenges in getting the data to work,
including usability issues and interoperability between differ-
ent systems that collect the same kinds of data; such issues
implied a clear fix based on a shared idea of what it means
for the system(s) to work correctly. In contrast, negotiating
access and calibrating structure required making trade-offs
for which there is no consensus among organizers for what
constitutes normal practice, or even best practice under ideal
conditions. Organizers described stances on member access
and data representation that reflected different–and sometimes
contradictory–ideas about what it means to be a good orga-
nizer. Negotiations around access to and structuring data to
enact these conceptions of ‘good organizing’ happened out-
side of the system, necessitated workarounds, and required
action at different levels of the organization (activist, organizer,
local leadership, sometimes national resources). In organizers’
efforts to do this work, we found that the temporal qualities
of using networked data tools interfered in specific ways with
organizers’ ability to effectively negotiate access and structure.
In this section, we first describe the reasons for and nature
of the work involved in managing data access and calibrating
data structure. We then describe how temporal aspects of using
networked data tools get in the way of organizers’ ability to
do this work.
Managing Data Access
“In a way, it was easier before we had it all in the cloud
because it wasn’t technically feasible for lots of people
to have access. It had to be really locked down... The
database lived on one laptop and you had to take turns
using it... I think access issues became more [of an issue]
when technical feasibility became less of a barrier. Most
people would never think, ‘oh I should have access to
that room where the filing cabinets are’ but when you see
a database you see people having it on their phones and
you think, ‘I could have that.”’ (P18)
In this section, we discuss how networked data access, or who
can see and add union membership information, impact work
practices and sociotechnical norms in field organization. Mem-
bership data is critical to unions’ missions because it shapes
union strategy and bargaining power. Therefore, workers
focus on keeping such data up-to-date and reflective of on-the-
ground situations (e.g., current, active membership; workplace
complaints; working conditions; possible new member leads,
etc.). The data is sensitive for both individuals (e.g., personal
information, workplace complaints) and the organization (e.g.,
assessment of membership support, notes on individual work-
ers). By networking membership data, that data can now be
accessed and updated remotely anywhere at any time by orga-
nizers. While this supports the goal of keeping union strategy
aligned with conditions on the ground, networked data access
also creates key concerns focused on data access control, pri-
vacy, and security. These issues arise because of the data’s
inherent sensitivity and because it can be harder to constrain
and control access to networked data. With networked access
adoption, organizers were also concerned with how different
access policies to networked data did or did not align with
core union values. Our interviews demonstrate that there is no
consensus about how to negotiate access to union membership
data, but that the work of negotiating differential access is
central for efficient data gathering and effective organizing.
Standard organizing practice includes field organizers training
member activists on how to accurately assess their co-workers’
levels of support for the union (e.g. [45]). Most of the organiz-
ers we interviewed agreed that it was important for member
activists to record their assessments in some way. They did not
agree, however, on whether activists ought to directly access
and input the assessments into the union’s data system. We use
differential access to describe the varying degrees to which
member organizers can access membership data (e.g. who can
see it, under what conditions, how much they can see, how
they input data).
The argument for more data access for member activists to
gather and directly report data member assessments is that it
empowers them to take ownership of their campaign by giving
them more immediate feedback on their progress toward their
benchmarks (P8, P12), develops activist leadership (P13), and
decreases the amount of time a staff organizer has to spend
entering data (P8, P6). The arguments for more restricted
data are motivated by concerns that the assessments logged by
activist organizers have the potential to be inaccurate:
“[T]here is a specific level of training and seriousness
that comes with assessments and elections... I’ve been
in situations where they thought they had so many 2’s
[union supporters]... And I had to go sit down with ev-
ery single organizing committee member and have them
walk me through every single assessment, and I redid the
numbers and we didn’t have it, and had to do an entire
new campaign right before the election.” (P6)
“I think the biggest issue throughout the campaign is that
our assessments were pretty soft. And I think that one of
the lesser commented-upon problems of disseminating
data access to the rank and file [union members during the
campaign] was that... quite frankly there were a bunch of
people who did not make good assessments. And I think
that was the point of the organizer one-on-ones, was to
actually review conversations.” (P5)
Both of these quotes highlight that the work of assessing mem-
ber support required not only training, but also a dialogue
between activists and staff organizers. Having the members
input their assessments directly meant that the data could be
‘soft’, potentially leading to errors in strategy or more work
for the organizer in the future.
How union-related data is accessed connects to questions of
union strategy by, for example, articulating the correct level
of commitment and training member activists need to have in
order to gain access to the database. Minimum barriers are
sometimes decided by union staff and the organizing commit-
tee and involve completing some amount of organizer training,
and maintaining some level of activism (by taking assignments
and doing them). These are organizational norms that need to
be enforced to protect against malfeasance:
“The key to making that work was also having really clear
and transparent criteria for when someone gets access,
when it gets revoked, and why they have the level of
access that they do. And then you’ve got to be rigorous
and fair about cutting people off when they don’t meet
that criteria. Because otherwise, you’re going to run into
the one person who needs to be cut off for a reason and
even though they don’t meet the criteria... if they see
all these other people that haven’t been cut off, it just
triggers resentment.” (P18)
Field-level organizers, who often mediate data access to mem-
ber organizers, were frequently in charge of developing and
maintaining differential levels of data access. Though only
some organizers we interviewed reported problems with ne-
gotiating differential access to union data, those that did con-
nected these problems to issues of campaign trust, rank-and-
file pushback, and organizing committee buy-in and participa-
tion in union strategy: “access to data is implicit trust. So a
restriction of access signaled the breakdown of trust, or a lack
of trust” (P3). Organizers also faced administrative burdens in
facilitating differential access. Even bespoke systems (in this
case, miniVAN) that in theory support partial and restricted ac-
cess to union data introduce administrative burdens in practice
for organizers to manage and restrict centralized data:
“Say you’re [an activist] on campus in the early part of
the afternoon. You’re walking and you talk to this woman
that you didn’t even know, and she’s a new [employee]
and you find out her name is Kristin something, ok, so to
[enter data about Kristin onto your list of contacts] you
have to... insert your list number into your [Voter Action
Network] app.. so the [field organizer] on the backend
produces [a new list including Kristin] and sends them
the list number. So if I were to find a new contact, I’d
have to log out of that list, log into a new list number, and
then assess her.” (P6)
In this quote, the staff organizer has to ‘cut’ a new limited
view of the organizing data for the activist she is working with
in order for the activist to assess someone that was not on their
delegated contact list. This work is considered necessary for
maintaining data integrity, but creates an annoying adminis-
trative burden on the activist and on P6, who has to, in that
moment, create the new list and list number. Organizers can
work around this by printing paper lists that are modifiable by
hand or work with activists in alternative systems like Google
Sheets. Both of these strategies require the organizer to do data
entry later. Ironically, whatever benefits a flexible system like
Google Sheets confers are diminished by organizers’ efforts to
create manageable data. For example, one organizer imposed
limits on what fields members can access and edit in an effort
to limit the amount of data cleaning and coordination that will
need to happen in the future: “I don’t want them to go ‘John’s
not on my list but I know John. I’ll just talk to John’ you know
and want to add a new person and a new ask. It doesn’t really
let you do that - you can click on a new cell and try to add
things and it won’t let you” (P19). By limiting access, P19
avoids incurring the future work of moving John’s assessment
from the new ask to the correct list and communicating it to
the person who was supposed to contact John.
Calibrating Data Structure
“When I first started here, and I first got into the database
that they had, you can kind of customize the header bar
they have, and people usually put something that’s ‘ha ha
tongue-in-cheek funny’ and there was a cartoon in there
of somebody holding a giant pile of paper and things and
they’re just standing there and it’s obviously clutter – it’s
very obviously clutter – and then the dialog box says ‘just
collect everything, we’ll sort out what we need later.”’
(P19)
“It’s like some people said ‘I want to create a database
that could effectively stand in for the actual world’ and
that, to me, is just chaos. Sometimes the ask is just
collecting something that never ends up being useful but
it needs to be there because someone wants it in there
because, you know, we’re trying to recreate society so I
can click on it.” (P19)
In this section, we examine the work involved in negotiating
practices around data structure, or how to decide, and who
decides, how membership data is represented. This includes
what data is collected and kept and what is gathered systemati-
cally versus what ought to be recorded in unstructured notes.
Databases allow data to be gathered in structured ways that can
be adapted to meet the needs of the local organizing context,
but also cultivate capacity to collect too much. Our interviews
demonstrate that union organizers have no consensus about
how to approach the structuring of union data because of the
trade-offs between these approaches.
Collecting more, but also more messy, data allows the orga-
nizer to potentially have more insights about the workplace,
facilitating more meaningful interactions with union members:
“[A]t the end of the day I could have one conversation
and it was amazing, and while I set certain qualitative
goals like ‘have a really great organizing conversation
with people who work front desk’ if I don’t have numbers,
if I’m not able to track over time like ‘oh I’m always able
to speak with people at this hour in the day’–without neat
data practices it became more about presence, showing
[workers] that ‘oh the union’s here’ but I’m not the union,
the [workers] are the union.” (P23)
In this example, the organizer compares her experiences work-
ing for two unions, one with more rigorous data practices than
the other. She connects the practice of consistently logging
worker locations and time to her ability to have targeted orga-
nizing conversations, where she could check in and motivate
members to take assignments, with empowering the mem-
bers to run their own union. Taking rigorous notes is also
sometimes framed as a way to help future organizers, acknowl-
edging both the potential for activist burnout and organizer
turnover (e.g. “What does the person coming after you need
to know?” (P21)):
“Something that my first bosses that I had used to say,
which is a little morbid, but I remember it fondly now,
he used to say ‘your notes should be so good that if you
were in a ditch, and couldn’t come back to work. If you
were run off the road and were in a ditch, somebody else
could pick up your turf and run with it.”’ (P23)
Yet other organizers saw the same rigorous data that could be
used to empower the organizer to in turn empower members
and potential organizers who came after them, as information
that may not be relevant for the next organizer. Organizers
worried that detailed notes could unduly bias an organizer
and hinder the forming of an authentic connection with the
person they were organizing (P18). Additionally, taking more
limited and strategic data could protect the privacy of the union
members and avoid awkward situations if members saw the
data in the future:
“I’m very judicious with what I decide to write in the
notes sections of any data thing. I usually say ‘may not
support’ or ‘may’ because ultimately I’ve had people who
were anti-union that have really come around. We had
someone who was circulating a de-certification petition...
who is on the bargaining committee... So I could have
put ‘scab’ ‘do not talk to’ but eventually she’s going to
see it.” (P7)
Organizers were also aware of how robust data gathering in-
creased the liability of sharing data with union membership.
The systems preserved data over time (some systems deliber-
ately make it difficult to remove old assessments to protect data
integrity) so data access required union staff to trust activists
not to “go look everything up” (P17).
Aside from negotiating the quantity of data collected, organiz-
ers also must negotiate the kinds of data that are collected and
how these are represented in the database. These questions
were deeply tied to union strategy and what would guide work
effectively on the ground. For example, when data structures
change frequently, it makes it difficult to compare data col-
lected longitudinally. Therefore, organizers felt every change
in data structure should be made only with respect to larger
strategy. For example, making a reoccurring information that
is only documented in a miscellaneous “notes” into a struc-
tured category in the database becomes a question of whether
you want to organize people by that issue (e.g. are they par-
ents? do they go to a certain church?).
Organizers also had concerns about whether particular ways of
structuring data result in data that meaningfully gauges union
support. Each “ask” or data-gathering event is a way to test
levels of support. If the ask is poorly suited to the context
on the ground, the assessment is not going to reflect potential
members’ realistic support and interest:
“[W]hen we were going into the strike last year, [my
manager] was really obsessing about my ability to assess
each member, signatures on petitions and things like
that. We had 90% participation in the last strike and they
wanted to go on strike again, but this petition did not
get to like, 80%. So [my manager asked], ‘how can we
go on strike again if the petition doesn’t even get 80%?’
and I said, ‘well, we do what we just did. We organize a
strike.’ These [workers] just marched around the whole
town. They wanted a rally or an event, and we came at
them with this petition, and I don’t think that was what
they wanted.” (P7)
Here the organizer communicates that the form of data that
his supervisor was using to represent the members’ support
for the strike–whether or not they signed the petition–did not
accurately capture their true support for the strike because it
was mismatched to the action that the members wanted to do
(a rally or an event to publicize their intent to strike).
Because data collection and organization was central to or-
ganizers’ efforts to mobilize on the ground, they had a stake
in how data was organized. However, as we will see in the
next section, they were not always empowered to change the
structure of data in union data tools. When it was not possible
to change the structured representation of the data, organizers
created workarounds in the systems they used. Sometimes
they made use of what they were allowed to change in the
database (e.g. making an “event” column in the database to
collect something that was not attending event) or, more often
relying on their own records (e.g., “a proliferation of Google
sheets”) to create more useful versions of the central database.
The organizer would then have to maintain multiple records,
the local and networked, manually mediating the import and
export of union data. Organizers who used Google sheets
as a central database found this creates additional work of
maintaining consistency:
“At first the main reasons we were worried about it were
security, which obviously we were concerned but over
time the issue has just become consistency... week to
week you can check in with the other organizers to see
what did we do this week, and is it recorded, and the
different places it would need to be recorded so we don’t
have data loss.” (P14)
Again, the initially appealing flexibility of the workaround
system was functionally constrained by the need to maintain
organizational accountability:
“[B]ut the other thing, when you change the way that
the data is recorded and viewed, it also changes your
expectations. Not so much for me, but for my supervisor,
our regional director, who has become accustomed to
now being able to look at these different places to see
similar types of information. So for example, she may
want to pull something up and see it at the bird’s eye level
on a spreadsheet that covers a summative analysis of the
different leads and perspective campaigns, and then drill
down by clicking on a link to see it at a [workplace] level.
so you become used to looking at things.. so even though
it’s a mess right now, it’s a mess you know your way
around.” (P14)
Since the workaround had become a means for sharing data
across different levels of the union, P14 not only shoulders
the burden of preventing data loss, but is also accountable to
produce data in the way it was anticipated by his supervisor.
Preserving the dysfunctional but familiar structure in turn
limits how much further calibration can be done.
Data Temporality and Discretion
“As an organizer myself, I don’t have backend access so
I can’t even restructure the [database] to make it a better
data collection tool. It has to be sent up through a chain
to tech people on high, who are seriously overwhelmed
by the amount of stuff they have to do so it’s hit or miss
what help you get.” (P13)
“There is a way in [the database] to have the main screen
open as the assessments came in, it just refreshes, and
you can see them live and so you can keep checking.”
(P3)
As described in the previous two sections, organizers engage
in significant work negotiating and working around issues with
data access and data structure. Their work to make data work
in organizing was complicated by the unique temporality of
networked data tools that made some aspects of this work too
slow and others too fast.
Working with data tools was too slow in the sense that in order
for data to reflect realities on the ground, organizers some-
times needed changes in the structure of a common database.
Encoding data structure digitally i.e. as a set of columns in
the database, introduces implementation lag and administra-
tive work. The lag issue was a major issue in our interviews,
as most organizers relayed stories about wanting something
changed in the customized the database. The organizers’ re-
quests would go through the organizational structure to be
implemented–or not implemented–by a technician:
“There was a guy... who was national level [data tech-
nician]. Normally what would happen is that anything
that had to be bulk uploaded or any changes to the data
architecture, I would be consulted, most of the time, and
I would often produce things but then the file would leave
my hands.” (P5)
Sometimes the “data guy” would travel to the local union to
understand how data was being used by the organizers. Other
times, the organizers were given a database created from a
template and the local calibration occurred through a series of
phone calls and email exchanges. Whether the changes were
implemented in a timely way, or at all, had to do with how
local needs were prioritized at state or federal level. Necessary
decisions about how to allocate technical expertise meant that
sometimes organizers had to “fend for themselves” (P14).
Organizers who experienced implementation lag were very
aware of the lack of on-site technical expertise, sometimes
wondering whether there ought to be someone more local with
permissions to reconfigure data:
“I get that you wouldn’t want to have just anyone in the
database to be able to change or add any fields because
it becomes kinda meaningless and you can’t compare
across different organizers’ turfs if everyone is using
different fields. So you need someone mediating and
ensuring that there’s consistency. I always thought that
should be someone a little bit closer to the campaign.
Either in my position, or immediately above me. Because
the way it did work was that the people who had access
to do that were data people, who didn’t necessarily know
what was going on in the campaign. So it was always
kind of a struggle to get them to understand why we
needed this or that.” (P18)
At the same time, networked tools were also too fast, in that
data entry allowed apparently instantaneous monitoring of the
activity of field organizers by their supervisors:
“We’d be given a lot of flexibility and autonomy in terms
of, here’s your map, here’s your turf list, come back to-
morrow morning at debrief. So we had the rest of the day
and the evening without any other tracking except that
we’d be putting assessments into the database. So I could
have just gone home and taken a nap, except that you
had to have assessments coming in, sort of somewhat-
regularly. We’d have to track if someone wasn’t home.
Enter in assessment ‘not home’ and then the lead orga-
nizer can see that you made 30 attempts that night. and I
would sometimes get calls like, I would be on the doors,
and I would write a note into the database, and then I’d
be driving and then I’d get a call from the lead organizer
and they’d be like ‘[P12], that note you just put in, tell
me about that conversation.”’ (P12)
While this organizer felt uncomfortable about how his lead
organizer was “clearly sit[ting] over the database, behind his
laptop, while we were at field, and watch[ing] the assessments
pour in,” he also noted that his supervisor was calling to con-
sult with him meaningfully about what he just saw (“it was
more like, a supportive or inquisitive call”). This was not al-
ways the case. For another organizer, the same in-the-moment
logging of organizing details that are available to management
contributed to a feeling of being both watched and disregarded:
“They want to know that they could highly monitor me
but they don’t monitor me. They track everything that I
do, but nothing is actually looked at, that I write.” (P7)
These two aspects of temporality interact. While field-level
organizers (and lead organizers, if their work also involved
going in the field) who worked closely with the membership
experienced implementation lag in getting the data representa-
tions to align with what they were seeing on the ground, their
supervisors, who operated a at a distance, interacted with the
same data as an apparently in-the-moment reflection of the
organizer’s work:
“[I]t’s the only hard metric, so my bosses will frequently
check my data entry to see if I’ve been working. And
they’ll like, watch the dashboard to see how it’s changed...
one of my bosses is obsessed with the percent on member
cards, and they really dig in to that.”(P7)
The descriptions of organizers’ experience highlights how
the tools are apparently slow—slow to change, slow to nav-
igate and work around—and, simultaneously, almost instant
in their ability to communicate detailed information from the
field to people looking on from a distance. One consequence
of this networked representation, compared to paper or non-
networked representation, is that the most current data being
gathered ceases to be in the sole purview of the organizer from
the moment that it is entered into the system.
This shift in data temporality has the potential to reshape data
processes further down the line. Earlier we described the
role of one-on-one debriefs between organizers and activists
as a means to negotiate assessments of membership support.
Similar debriefs also occur between field organizers and lead
organizers. These meetings provide an opportunity to get the
context for an assessment, or in the words of an organizer who
also worked as a lead, to “mediat[e] between cold hard data
and the experiences of the organizers and the people who it
needs to be reported to” (P18). In situations when the most
up-to-date numbers needed to be shared with leads, the debrief
meeting potentially consists of both “reporting” (e.g. sharing
one’s numbers) and discussions about strategy and planning
that emerge out of reporting the data.
However, since networked data collection removes the need
for reporting, the functional purpose of debriefing may change,
since it reduces the chances that the field organizer will be un-
derstood as communicating organizationally-valuable, unique
knowledge. At the same time, from our interviews, we learned
that debriefs can take very different stances on the value of
an organizer’s perspective, regardless of the data systems be-
ing used. Even when one organizer was reporting numbers
from paper, her corresponding perspectives on strategy were
dismissed as “overintellectualizing her job”(P13). Conversely,
it is possible to have the lead organizer “pull reports from
the database and do personal check-ins” (i.e. to debrief with
field organizers even while having the most current numbers).
This suggests that the use of networked tools does not in it-
self decrease the organizer’s ability to affect strategy. But in
situations where the field organizer’s perspective is already
being disregarded, the tool potentially compound the lack of
discretion by diminishing the opportunity for the organizer to
communicate the data’s context while giving the supervisor
immediate, remote access to apparently robust data logged by
the organizer in the field.
DISCUSSION
Our results document the situated work of field organizers in
making data work for their organizing efforts and for union
strategy. The results make clear that underneath questions
around data collection, access, structure, accuracy, and use lurk
bigger questions about the role that field organizers play in in-
forming and shaping union activity. The answers to these ques-
tions are based not simply on the properties of networked data
tools but on how they refract with organizational hierarchies
and power dynamics that characterize field organizing work.
As our results suggest, the affordances of networked data tools
can decrease discretion in campaign decision-making at the
level of the field-organizer. In our discussion, we return to
the distinction between ’top-down’ and ’bottom-up models’ of
union organization: in the top-down model, central union staff
set strategy and mobilize union membership; in the bottom-up
model, union members mobilize themselves with the support
of union staff [41, 42]. First, we discuss how top-down organi-
zational approaches can systematically degrade the quality of
data collected. Next, we describe an approach for using data
tools in a more bottom-up manner.
Data-driven from the top down
Field-level organizers are on the boundary between the union
membership at the “bottom” and union’s strategy and re-
sources at the “top”, sometimes finding themselves in situ-
ations where they have to choose between “achiev[ing] the
goals” and “alienat[ing] the turf” (P17). This puts them in a
unique position to see mismatches between the data being gath-
ered and situation on the ground. But their ability to account
for mismatches is limited by their position in union hierarchy.
Our results indicate that the degree to which local union lead-
ership value such feedback from field-level organizers varies
across different campaigns. Structurally, however, the tools
have the potential to diminish opportunities for feedback to
take place at all by centralizing immediate, robust representa-
tions of the field. Especially if the field organizer is including
detailed notes, the supervisor may believe that they already
understand the context of the data without discussing it with
the organizer.
Organizers saw these tools as having real potential to reveal
patterns and new opportunities to organize the workers. This
potential was not always realized, because, as detailed in our
results, changes to system access permissions or data structure
had to be be funneled through the top: the “data guy,” a techni-
cal resource operating from afar. In one situation, an organizer
pushed the lead to include a dedicated column in the database
to track worker issues in a systematic way with the goal of
organizing workers around those issues, but the change was
never implemented. It had to go up the hierarchy to get to the
data experts, but to get there, it first had to get to the campaign
director, which was risky given organizational tensions in that
campaign. According to her account, pushing for this change
got the organizer in trouble with her supervisor and the only
reason she was not fired from her job was because she had
made herself “indispensable” to the campaign.
This story highlights a double bind for field organizers in
producing accurate data. In order to improve data (e.g by
recommending new categories, or removing ones that alienate
membership), organizers must risk pushing against organiza-
tional hierarchies to contribute their contextual knowledge.
But the more they generate accurate, immediate representa-
tions of their context, the more dispensable they become and
the riskier it becomes to push back. As a result, more “ro-
bust” data gathering may actually create fewer opportunities
for the data or strategy to be corrected and thus result in poorer
understanding of members.
Data-driven from the bottom up
The question this dilemma raises is whether it is possible to
shift sensibilities in using networked data tools to a more
bottom-up approach. The perspectives of field organizers
suggests first that data tools play an important role in union
organizing. While organizers described ways that the data they
gathered failed to tell the whole story, or expressed skepticism
about the impact of data tools, the organizers we interviewed
overwhelmingly thought the tools were necessary. They be-
lieved that the ones they had were usually, but not always,
better than experienced or imagined past alternatives. Even
with their administrative burdens and imperfect implemen-
tation, the tools “worked” because they consolidated data.
This data helped organizers and member activists track their
progress toward a campaign, which is necessary for them as
an organization that needs to reach a majority.
The question then is what needs to shift for these tools to better
support bottom-up organizing between member activists and
field organizers. Our results suggest that issues of access and
structure, compounded by implementation lag and organiza-
tional scrutiny, made it difficult for staff organizers to confer
the same level of organizational knowledge to the activists
they worked alongside. But another barrier was simply that
the data tools were not being used to develop or assess activist
leadership. Because the priority of the campaign was to assess
individual worker support, the organizers we interviewed were
being sent out to assess, or delegate the assessment of indi-
viduals. These assessments of support were based on specific
actions – wearing a sticker, signing a petition, posing for a
photo; in contrast, there was little emphasis on assessing a
member’s leadership based on their efficacy in organizing their
colleagues.
One alternative is to develop data practices to evaluate worker
“structure,” i.e. the ability of individual workers to convince
their co-workers to participate in actions [42], which closely
resemble the ones in use to assess individual support. It is
possible that data tools drawing on Customer Relationship
Management paradigms represent union membership as a flat
list of people by default. But the same or similar tools could
be used to map structure; some data systems in use already
support mapping lead and follow structures [2]. The more
meaningful difference is that this method of assessing support
relies more substantially on activist workers and activist lead-
ers to assess and leverage leadership than ones that simply
track individual union support.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our results suggest one possible direction for future technical
system design, which is to design data tools that anticipate
workaround data practices. Such tools should support the ex-
porting and importing of structured data and put design effort
toward supporting cases where local versions of the data may
not be in the exact same format as the central database. More
generally, this means that in addition to facilitating normal
client-side data entry, user experience resources could support
structured data migration (e.g. excel or csv files) on the ‘front
end.’ Aside from this, our results signal that that there are few
easy technical solutions to solving problems of union strategy.
In part this is because members of the union’s organization
must negotiate these decisions together. Our results also cau-
tion about the costs of replacing data systems with versions
hoped to be better, because replacing data tools places addi-
tional administrative burdens on union staff. Especially in
situations where there is no clear design fix, it may be more
practical to strain out the smaller usability issues in the existing
tools than to replace them with newly conceived ones.
A broader implication of our research is that labor unions may
be more effective in understanding their membership by re-
organizing their technical resources. While it is necessary for
many questions of data access and structure to be resolved in
groups involving levels of the unions’ organization, it is possi-
ble that some of the technical implementation could happen
not in national and state offices, but in union locals. The need
for technical expertise to calibrate data access and structures
could also be addressed by training field and lead organizers
in basic data systems modification.
Finally, if the way forward for improved data practices is re-
considering how data decision-making happens, then more
research is needed to understand the organizational relation-
ships described in our interviews. What factors, outside of
having organizationally-valuable knowledge, shape the expe-
rience of field-level organizers? Here, it could be useful to
revisit the question of building trades unions, and the organi-
zational differences between staffers in building trades and
service and professional workers unions. Our results show
how organizational dynamics, combined with the temporal
affordances of data tools, can distort data by systematically
preventing opportunities for feedback and calibration. This
suggests that further research into the experience of field-level
organizers can inform our understanding of data practices in
forms of organizationally-complex work in other domains.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we describe how networked data management
systems impact the on-the-ground experiences of organizers
and what work they must do to actually make the data use-
ful for the union and their own work as organizers. We have
described how field organizers negotiate differential levels
of data access and calibrate representations of the data to
different levels of the union’s organization. We have also
shown how organizer’s ability to do these things is potentially
impacted by the use of networked data tools, because the
tools introduce implementation lag and change the way knowl-
edge is exchanged within the organization, limiting the unique
knowledge the field level organizer can leverage in making
recommendations. We discuss how the use of these tools con-
strains the organizer’s ability to efficiently share membership
data with activists, potentially hindering data gathering and
member activist leadership development. We make recom-
mendations for improvements to the design of systems–to
anticipate and support data workarounds through better front-
end data migration–and to the role and distribution of technical
expertise within the labor union’s organization structure.
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